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Sixty years is a brief interlude in human history.  Yet in that space of 
time, the human rights movement—human rights organizations, other rights 
advocates, governments, and international organizations—have made 
incredible progress in norm-setting and in influencing how governments 
treat people.  In 1945, there was no universal recognition, for example, of 
the “inalienable rights” of individuals to be free from torture or official 
cruelty.  Under Eleanor Roosevelt’s leadership, the United Nations (UN) 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, providing 
universal rights standards on these and other fundamental subjects.  Since 
then, there has been substantial international attention on human rights 
issues and a proliferation of treaties that spell out core human rights 
standards.  Today, as part of their diplomatic portfolio, many governments 
recognize an obligation to ensure rights in their own societies and to work 
collectively with others to secure basic rights around the world.  
In the last fifteen years, there also has been a corresponding evolution of 
an ambitious system of international enforcement systems.  These include 
international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda that were 
created in the 1990s, as well as more recent special courts in places like 
Sierra Leone and East Timor.  In 1998, governments created the first 
International Criminal Court, based in The Hague, to which more than one 
hundred countries are now state parties.  
On a parallel track, there has been an extraordinary proliferation of 
nongovernmental human rights organizations around the world.  Twenty-
five years ago, there were a very small number of human rights 
organizations outside of Western Europe and North America.  But now the 
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creation of these local human rights groups—in almost every country in the 
world—has provided a powerful response to arguments by governments 
that demands for respect for human rights are an improper interference by 
outsiders in their domestic affairs.  The world has come a long way toward 
creating international baseline standards for the protection of human rights.  
Yet today we face an unexpected challenge that threatens to undermine this 
progress.  It is the assertion by the U.S. government and others that, after 
the September 11 attacks, the world has been engaged in a “global war 
against terrorism” where international human rights rules simply do not 
apply. 
I will examine this premise and how the Bush Administration has applied 
it in practice.  Specifically, I will examine how this premise applies to the 
detention and interrogation of so-called “unlawful enemy-combatants.”  I 
view the assertion of this new paradigm as a serious threat to the human 
rights standards and enforcement mechanisms that have developed over the 
last half-century.  In response, I believe there is a pressing need to 
aggressively challenge this approach in order to “hold the line” on what has 
been accomplished since World War II.  
I. THE NEW NORMAL 
The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C. led 
to a range of new security measures and changed the human rights debate in 
this country and around the world.  The threats posed by groups like Al-
Qaeda are real and significant.  These groups are well-organized and well-
financed.  They intend to launch violent strikes aimed at civilians in the 
U.S. and elsewhere.  Governments have an obligation to provide security.  
There are many things that the U.S. government has done well since 
September 2001 to enhance security through measures that do not 
jeopardize civil liberties and human rights.  For example, protecting airports 
and nuclear plants; strengthening front-line defenders such as police, fire, 
and emergency medical people; creating a Director of National Intelligence; 
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and the work of the 9/11 Commission.  A number of recommendations that 
the government has made in these and other areas are prudent, wise, and 
within the bounds of law.  These are things that I would call “rights 
neutral,” and in policy terms, they are essential to security.  
Unfortunately, the U.S. government and the Bush administration has also 
engaged in a series of actions on a parallel track, and these actions have 
dramatically changed the relationship between the government and its 
people.  The administration sometimes refers to these actions as the “new 
normalcy.”  Vice President Cheney used that term in late 2001, stating that 
it reflects “an understanding of the world as it is.”2  In his view, and in those 
of other senior administration officials, the idea is that: on one side there is 
war, on the other side there is the law.  And when fighting the “global war 
on terrorism,” they assert that law becomes a luxury, not a necessity, that 
socieities may no longer be able to afford.  I will refer to these changes as 
the “new normal” and I will outline its four key elements: 
1. Restriction on both openness of government and access to 
information; 
2. Infringement on personal privacy; 
3. Discriminatory treatment of immigrants, minorities, and 
noncitizens; and 
4. New rules governing the treatment of security detainees. 
The administration’s “global war against terrorism” extends to the fifty 
states and throughout the world.  It has no time limits.  The enemy is 
vaguely defined.  This is a radical framework that the administration 
justifies by asserting that we are fighting a war against a new kind of 
enemy, where the law is an impediment to the government’s ability to do 
what needs to be done.  They say, in essence, “trust us, we are doing the 
right thing, and our actions will keep Americans safe.”  
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales said that in the “war against terrorism,” criminal charges and trials 
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are “neither necessary nor appropriate.”3  Mr. Gonzales has also stated that 
as commander in chief, the president has the authority to override the laws 
passed by Congress if he is acting in the name of national security.   
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has said that “different rules have to apply” 
to the “enemy-combatants and terrorists who are being detained for acts of 
war against our country.”4  Most recently, at the administration’s urging, 
Congress established a military trial system that largely abandons the time-
tested military justice standards for fair trials.  
II. HOW DOES THIS PLAY OUT IN PRACTICE?  
A. Openness in Government 
Historically, a central premise of the U.S. system has been a presumption 
that an informed citizenry needs information from government to make the 
best decisions.  Madison said that “popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”5  
This administration has turned that presumption on its head.  The 
administration believes that most actions bearing any relation to national 
security must be kept secret.  Governor Thomas Kean, who headed the 9/11 
Commission, said that three-quarters of the classified documents that he 
read in preparation for the Commission’s report should not have been 
classified.6  A National Archives audit found that one-third of the records 
re-classified by the CIA and other agencies in 2005 were wrongly kept 
secret.7  The Government Accountability Office has criticized Department 
of Defense classification procedures as being inconsistent and lacking 
oversight.8  Former Senate leader Trent Lott has urged an independent 
board to overhaul the current classification system.9  This administration is 
not only keeping information from the public, it is keeping information 
from people whose job it is to make the law.  
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B.  Personal Privacy 
The law regulating the executive branch’s authority to pry into 
Americans’ private lives has changed dramatically since September 11.   
These changes have raised fears that bedrock principles of personal privacy 
and presumptive innocence (e.g., the Fourth Amendment) have been 
replaced with a new normal of widespread surveillance and generalized 
suspicion. 
In 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act.  It allows broad 
federal police power for wire taps, access to information, library records, 
and the like.10  And the administration has exceeded this broad surveillance 
authority provided by Congress.  It has used electronic surveillance to 
record the conversations of persons within the United States11 and has 
collected potentially millions of domestic phone records without obtaining 
the court order required by law.12  In September 2006, the House of 
Representatives approved a bill that, if passed into law, would not only 
permit unrestricted retention and use of communications of U.S. citizens 
obtained without a warrant, it would also grant new authority for 
warrantless surveillance of a wide range of domestic and international calls 
involving U.S. citizens.13  
C.  Treatment of Foreigners, Minorities, and Noncitizens 
In times of crisis or war, the first groups targeted are usually foreigners, 
noncitizens, and minorities.  This has been true throughout U.S. history, 
beginning with the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798.  It was true in the 
1850s, when the Know Nothing Party attacked Catholics, Jews, refugees, 
and foreigners.  It was true after World War I, when the Mitchell Palmer 
raids focused on foreigners.  It was true during World War II, with the 
Japanese internments.  And it is true today, when Muslim Americans and 
individuals from the Middle East and South Asia are targeted, officially and 
unofficially.  
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Initially, after the September 11 attacks, the Justice Department detained 
more than twelve hundred people without charge and without a rational 
basis.14  A two hundred-page Justice Department internal study written by 
the inspector general strongly condemned both the abusive treatment of 
these groups of people and the basis for their arrests.15  
In 2002, the administration announced a re-registration program through 
which young Muslim men—men from twenty-five different countries who 
were living in the United States—were forced to be fingerprinted and 
questioned by U.S. immigration officials.  Many were detained.  Eighty-
three thousand people went through this re-registration process.16  The 
government has not reported a single bit of intelligence that came to light as 
a result of this—a program intended to help protect American national 
security.17  Eventually, after much controversy, the program was 
disbanded.18  But it caused enormous upset and distrust within the affected 
communities.  
In spring of 2006, Congress considered a number of wide-ranging 
immigration proposals as part of a “comprehensive reform” initiative.19  
The House of Representatives approved a bill that, if passed into law, would 
expand the executive branch’s authority to detain noncitizens; would give 
government officials power to make secret immigration determinations; 
would criminalize individuals present in the United States who lack proper 
documentation; and would authorize local law enforcement personnel to 
enforce federal immigration law.20  
Overseas refugee admissions into the United States have decreased 
significantly.  Almost fifty-four thousand people were admitted as refugees 
last year,21 compared with over one hundred thousand in 1990,22 and as 
many as two hundred thousand in the early 1980s.23  As of October 2005, 
only 32,900 people applied for asylum,24 compared to 63,230 applications 
four years ago.25  One important reason is that asylum seekers are being 
detained and face the prospect of months, or even years, in jail before their 
cases are resolved.  In addition, in May 2005, Congress also passed the Real 
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ID Act, which, among other things, makes it more difficult for people to 
seek political asylum in this country.26  It creates a series of new restrictions 
that are justified by national security concerns. 
D.  Security Detentions and Interrogations 
A fourth broad category of the “new normal” is security detentions and 
interrogation practices.  There have been two important cases involving 
security detainees who are American citizens—Yasser Hamdi and Jose 
Padilla.  Each was held in military detention in the United States as enemy-
combatants—without a lawyer, without charge, and without trial.  The 
Supreme Court essentially overthrew Hamdi’s detention, and eventually he 
was allowed to go to Saudi Arabia after more than two years in detention.27  
Padilla, an American citizen arrested at O’Hare airport, was held in 
detention for more than three years without being charged or tried.  For two 
years he had no lawyer.  In November 2005, before the Supreme Court had 
the opportunity to review the legality of his military detention, the federal 
government indicted Padilla on crimes unrelated to terrorist plots within the 
United States and transferred him to civilian custody.28    
Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatar student, is now the lone enemy-
combatant on U.S. soil.  The FBI arrested him on fraud charges in 
December 2002.  In June 2003, just weeks before his planned trial, the 
administration declared Al-Marri an “enemy-combatant” in the war on 
terror.  Al-Marri is still being held in military custody, without charge or 
trial, and has had limited access to his attorneys.  Al-Marri’s petition for 
writ of habeas corpus is now proceeding.29 
Outside of the continental United States, there are more than fourteen 
thousand people being held by Americans in detention centers30—
approximately 450 at Guantanamo,31 and approximately 500 in 
Afghanistan.32  There are fourteen thousand detainees in Iraq.33  
Over the last five years, some senior administration officials have been 
unwilling to accept the application of international legal standards 
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prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of these detainees.  A 
2002 memo from the White House said that the Geneva Conventions did 
not apply in Afghanistan, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which requires humane treatment.34  The memo then extended 
that same blanket exception to foreign fighters in Iraq.  Pursuant to a 
presidential order, the military began trying detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
in military commissions that failed to protect the accused’s right to a fair 
trial.  
In 2002, officials in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice 
Department, including John Yoo and Jay Bybee, wrote memos that 
essentially redefined the term torture to mean the equivalence of organ 
failure, serious bodily injury, or even death.35  They defined torture not to 
include cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, which meant that abusive 
interrogation techniques would be legally used and acceptable in 
Guantanamo.  
At the end of 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld decided to change 
military rules on interrogation.36  A Pentagon working group proposed 
thirty-five methods of coercive interrogations.  Secretary Rumsfeld 
endorsed twenty-four of them.37  His modified rules for interrogations at 
Guantanamo later migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq.  These new rules allow 
interrogators to subject detainees to sleep deprivation, use of dogs, stress 
positions, and the like.  
Not surprisingly, the combination of illegal detention and interrogation 
practices has led to serious abuses.  The Pentagon has initiated 
approximately eight hundred investigations into these abuses.38  According 
to a report by Human Rights First, close to one hundred people have died in 
U.S. custody; the Pentagon classifies thirty-four of those cases as criminal 
homicides.39  At least eight of these people were literally tortured to death.  
Only twelve deaths resulted in any kind of punishment for those 
perpetrating the abuse.40  Of the thirty-four cases being investigated as 
criminal homicides, none occurred at Guantanamo, and only one at Abu 
       Human Rights in the Post-September 11 Environment 189 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006 
Ghraib.  These numbers reflect a serious crisis, and many of the architects 
of these policies are still in senior positions in government.  
These abuses prompted Congress to explicitly prohibit any cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees in the form of the Detainee 
Treatment Act.  Sponsored by Senator John McCain in 2005, it passed both 
Houses of Congress by overwhelming margins.41  But when President Bush 
signed the bill into law, he included a signing statement that purports to 
leave open the possibility that members of the executive branch could still 
authorize cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees.42  
The U.S. courts have also been highly skeptical of the administration’s 
broad assertions of executive power and its approach to detention and 
interrogation policies.  In June 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which requires humane treatment, applies to all individuals in U.S. 
detention, regardless of their status.  The Court also held that the president 
lacked the authority to establish military commissions without 
Congressional authorization and that the commissions he had created in late 
2001 violated the law of war. 43  
Following the Court’s decision in Hamdan, the U.S. military took a 
number of good faith steps to implement the ruling.  In September 2006, the 
army issued its new field manual on interrogations, a document that is 
largely consistent with international law principles and that embraces the 
Geneva Conventions standards.  The adoption of this new field manual 
represents a victory for those in the military who have struggled to return to 
the rule of law.44  
More troubling was the administration’s broader response to the Hamdan 
decision.  At the urging of the administration, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006.  It is a sweeping law that, among other things, 
creates a new system of military commissions to try some of those detained 
as illegal enemy-combatants in the “global war on terrorism.” 
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On the plus side, Congress refused to grant the president authority to 
redefine the humane treatment requirements of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, despite intense executive-branch pressure.  Those 
requirements—which provide both fair-trial protections and basic standards 
of humane treatment—remain intact, and all U.S. personnel must comply 
with them. 
But the new law also contains a number of deeply disturbing provisions, 
such as the creation of a new legal definition of “unlawful enemy-
combatant.”  This new definition blurs the most fundamental distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants.  The definition of “unlawful 
enemy-combatant” is so broad and vague that it could encompass U.S. 
citizens picked up in the United States as well as people who have not 
engaged directly in any hostilities against the United States.  The 
administration has long argued that the entire world is a battlefield in a new 
kind of war paradigm. 
Additionally, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 seeks to strip away a 
key “check” on executive-branch compliance with U.S. and international 
law: the ability of the courts to hear challenges to detention via the writ of 
habeas corpus and through civil lawsuits.  The Act also explicitly seeks to 
prevent courts from hearing claims of violations of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
III.  THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Throughout the five years of debate on these issues, some senior 
administration officials have created a hostile environment in which being 
critical of the administration’s policies is unpatriotic.  When John Ashcroft 
testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001, he referred, 
in inflammatory terms, to persons engaged in debate regarding rights versus 
security: 
to those who pit Americans against immigrants, and citizens 
against non-citizens; to those who scare peace-loving people with 
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phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid 
terrorists—for they erode our national unity and diminish our 
resolve.  They give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause 
to America’s friends.  They encourage people of good will to 
remain silent in the face of evil.45   
 Other senior administration officials and their allies also have sought to 
silence this debate by attacking the messengers.  When the New York Times 
released information on the government’s surveillance of bank records, the 
chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, Peter King, called 
for criminal prosecution of the newspaper.46  When critics of administration 
policies within the government leaked reports of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—first on Abu Ghraib, then on 
Guantanamo—administration officials and their allies in the news media 
fiercely attacked the credibility of the ICRC.  The Wall Street Journal, for 
example, called the ICRC “an ideological organization unable to distinguish 
between good guys and bad . . . no longer careful, scrupulous and neutral.”47  
And within an hour of Senator Debbie Stabenow’s (D-MI) vote in favor of 
the Specter Amendment, which maintained detainees’ rights to challenge 
their detention in U.S. courts (through a writ of habeas corpus), the National 
Republican Senatorial Committee issued a statement declaring she had 
“sided with trial lawyers and terrorists instead of common sense . . . 
Stabenow’s continued incompetence when it comes to keeping America 
safe is staggering.”48  
IV. THE WAY FORWARD 
A.  Working with New Allies 
These issues of national security are part of a much larger and very 
polarized political debate in the United States.  In order to change this 
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dynamic, those of us who seek to restore basic human rights norms need to 
go beyond traditional lines of alliance.  We and others have begun this 
process by enlisting those we call “unlikely allies” or “strange bedfellows.”  
One of the most important developments for Human Rights First has 
been our growing relationships with retired senior U.S. military leaders.   
These senior military leaders are as upset about the administration’s 
detention and interrogation policies as any group in this country.  They 
understand the corrosive effect of these policies, perhaps better than any of 
us.  The military lives by discipline and a chain of command.  When senior 
Pentagon officials essentially tell the military to “take the gloves off,” the 
result is that it makes it impossible for good commanders and leaders in the 
military to ensure discipline and respect for rules and law that are essential 
to the military’s effectiveness.  
Human Rights First has now identified and is working closely with more 
than forty former senior military officers—retired admirals and generals—
who have joined us in challenging various aspects of the administration’s 
policies.  In the summer of 2003, when Human Rights First issued a report 
on secret detentions that identified about twenty-five U.S. run facilities 
where representatives of the ICRC have no access,49 we helped coordinate 
the drafting of a public letter by eight retired U.S. admirals and generals 
denouncing the use of such facilities.  
When Alberto Gonzales was nominated as Attorney General, thirteen 
flag and field officers, including General John Shalikashvili, a former head 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed grave concerns about Mr. Gonzales’ 
views on the Geneva Conventions and coercive interrogations; those 
officers articulated their concerns in an open letter to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in January 2005.50  In October 2005, when the McCain 
Amendment—banning the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment by any U.S. personnel anywhere in the world—was 
being debated, we coordinated a letter to Senator McCain in support of his 
amendment, and that letter was signed by twenty-nine retired military 
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leaders.  A few months later, in January 2006, when President Bush signed 
the McCain Amendment into law, twenty-two retired military leaders 
signed a letter to the president urging commitment to its implementation.  In 
September 2006, we coordinated a letter from almost fifty admirals and 
generals, including five former heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urging the 
Senate Armed Services Committee not to adopt the proposed legislation 
redefining Common Article 3 in a way that violated the core principles of 
the Geneva Conventions.51  The final legislation adopted by the Senate and 
House rejected the administration’s proposal to redefine the humane 
treatment standards of Common Article 3, making it clear that subjecting 
detainees to treatment that involves serious physical or mental pain or 
suffering is a war crime.52  
In our view, in order for these and related efforts to be successful, it is 
important to engage and involve people who have been strong supporters of 
President Bush’s Iraq war policies.  Some of our critics charge that the 
concerns about Abu Ghraib, detention practices, and Guantanamo are only 
coming from people who are opposed to the war in Iraq—it is very 
important for us to separate these two issues.  It is possible to be a supporter 
of the president’s policies on Iraq, and other foreign policy issues, and yet 
strongly oppose the torture and mistreatment of prisoners.  
B.  Reinforcing International Norms 
In addressing these issues going forward, it also is critical that we 
reinforce international human rights norms.  The administration has 
challenged international law on a number of issues.  The international 
community needs to respond forcefully to the administration’s violations to 
ensure that core international human rights protections are maintained.  
One area where these principles are being tested relates to the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. treaty law.  Another area of concern 
relates to detention.  This is an area where international law is less clear and 
one where we have to find common language and a common strategy.  
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Another grey area is minimum due process standards in security cases.  
What are these standards in criminal cases?  And what is the applicability of 
the Geneva Conventions, particularly in places like the detention centers in 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo, where the administration has declared 
everyone an “enemy-combatant”?  The administration’s view is that the 
Geneva Conventions are irrelevant in these cases, but in Hamdan the 
Supreme Court has held that Common Article 3 applies.  We need to 
address all of these issues and reinforce the importance of adhering to 
international law and institutions. 
C.  An Affirmative Agenda 
We also need to develop a stronger agenda for challenging extremist 
violence.  It is incumbent upon the human rights movement not only to rally 
against government excesses; we must also find ways to combat these 
violent attacks against civilians as crimes.  One way to do so is through the 
United Nations, which has been considering a draft Comprehensive 
Convention Against Terrorism for a number of years.  There are thirteen 
derivative conventions dealing with terrorist acts, all of which refer back to 
the Comprehensive Convention.53  The Comprehensive Convention is 
stalemated largely because governments cannot agree on a definition of 
terrorism.54  Ultimately, it may not be possible to overcome this impasse.   
But as a starting point, any definition of terrorism should encompass actions 
that are intended to cause bodily harm to civilians for the purpose of 
intimidating a population or to force governments to act or not act.  
I think it is important for the human rights community to help define acts 
of terrorism as crimes.  We should encourage governments and international 
tribunals to prosecute terrorist acts, subject to an internationally agreed 
upon definition.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
The erosion of core human rights standards in the United States is having 
profound and troubling effects around the world.  Repressive governments 
in places like Zimbabwe, Egypt, China, and Russia increasingly cite the 
new “American model” of detention and interrogation in order to justify 
their own actions.55  The world is closely watching to see how the United 
States responds to the challenges posed by this erosion of civil liberties in 
our own society. 
Thirty years ago, Justice William Douglas wrote to a group of young 
lawyers in the State of Washington.  Unfortunately, his comments seem 
particularly apt today.  He wrote: “As nightfall does not all come at once, 
neither does oppression.  In both instances, there is a twilight when 
everything remains seemingly unchanged.  And it is in such twilight that we 
all must be most aware of change in the air—however slight—lest we 
become unwitting victims of the darkness.”56 
Today we find ourselves in the twilight, and it is incumbent upon all of us 
to respond in whatever ways we can to fend off the darkness.  I am an 
optimist and believe that we can, and will, correct our course.  But to do so, 
all of us must be ready to play an active role and challenge those who seek 
to fundamentally change our constitutional system—a system of which we 
are so rightfully proud. 
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